Article 6 negotiations handbook for Eastern Africa by Hoch, Stephan et al.








Article 6 negotiations handbook for Eastern Africa
Hoch, Stephan ; Weldner, Kaja ; Michaelowa, Axel ; Kassaye, Ruth
Abstract: This paper is meant as a handbook for negotiators from East Africa to make important
contributions to the Article 6 negotiations and the finalisation of the rulebook to represent their priorities
and circumstances. It provides a summary of the history and status of current Article 6 negotiations
and identifies and discusses issues that are relevant to Eastern African countries. Finally, negotiation
strategies are discussed to support the positions of the Eastern African negotiators.





Hoch, Stephan; Weldner, Kaja; Michaelowa, Axel; Kassaye, Ruth (2021). Article 6 negotiations handbook
for Eastern Africa. Kampala: Eastern African Alliance on Carbon Markets and Climate Finance.
Article 6 Negotiations 
Handbook for Eastern Africa
Article 6 Negotiations Handbook for Eastern Africa2
Current Member States:
Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda
Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda 
Article 6 Negotiations Handbook for Eastern Africa 3
Purpose of the Guidebook 
After 2020, international carbon markets will transition from the Kyoto Mechanisms - governed in a 
top down fashion - to the Paris Agreement which is structured in a bottom up sense. In the future, 
Parties can generate and trade carbon credits through bilaterally governed cooperative approaches 
(under Article 6.2 of the Paris Agreement) or activities under a multilaterally governed mechanism 
(under Article 6.4) building on the lessons of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). In addition, 
a framework for non-market-based approaches under Article 6.8 will allow Parties to engage in 
cooperation which does not involve the transfer of emission reduction credits. However, Parties have 
not yet agreed on the final rules for operationalizing the Article 6 mechanisms. Due to the COVID-19 
pandemic an international framework on Article 6 will be adopted earliest in November 2021 at 
COP26. The continuation of issuance of CDM credits after 2020 is uncertain. At the same time the 
first bilateral pilot activities for Article 6.2 are being developed, including in EAA member states.
In this uncertain situation, it is important that negotiators from East Africa meaningfully contribute 
to the negotiations to finalize Article 6 rules, based on regional priorities and circumstances. In this 
context, this guidebook aims to (i) facilitate understanding of Article 6 negotiation matters in an 
exhaustive yet simplified manner and (ii) contribute to strengthening negotiation skills necessary 
for drafting text and mobilizing support for East African positions. It briefly summarizes the historical 
roots of the Article 6 negotiations and the architecture of the approaches (sections 2.1 and 2.2) 
before presenting the key outstanding negotiation issues with a focus on priorities of Eastern African 
countries (section 2.3). Chapter 3 discusses a selection of specific practical implications of the Article 
6 framework, namely the transition of CDM activities and Article 6 pilots in East African countries. 
In chapter 4, strategic approaches for eliciting support for negotiation positions are outlined. In the 
Annexes, readers will find key resources that delve further into the topics presented throughout the 
handbook.
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Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU), represent the opinion of the authors 
and are neither necessarily representative of the position of the funder nor of the Gesellschaft 
für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ GmbH), United National Framework on Climate Change 
secretariat, East Africa Development Bank or Eastern African Alliance on Carbon Markets and 
Climate Finance member states”.
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Introduction
All Parties to the Paris Agreement (PA) specify Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) 
with mitigation targets; most developing countries also define adaptation actions in their 
NDCs. Yet, the sum of current NDCs is inconsistent with an emissions path to achieve the PA’s 
goal to contain climate change “well below” 2°C and pursue efforts to limit the temperature 
increase further to 1.5°C. Therefore, in five-year cycles, countries are expected to “ratchet 
up” the ambition of their NDC targets. International carbon markets can help countries raise 
their mitigation ambition through international cooperation, as market mechanisms can 
lower the cost and increase the flexibility of achieving mitigation outcomes. Article 6 of the 
PA establishes three avenues for voluntary cooperation between Parties, two of which are 
market-based approaches:
 • Cooperative approaches, pursuant to Article 6.2, PA: refers to the bilateral or multilateral 
international trading of mitigation outcomes. It is determined by Parties, but subject to 
international guidance and reporting and transparency requirements.
 • The mechanism for mitigation and sustainable development established in Article 6.4 
(sometimes called ‘sustainable development mechanism’) refers to a multilaterally 
governed baseline and crediting mechanism, and can be seen as the successor of the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) under the Kyoto Protocol (KP).
 • Article 6.8 establishes a ‘framework for non-market-based approaches’(NMAs) which 
acknowledges the importance of non-market based-cooperation to promote mitigation 
and adaptation ambition.
While the broad contours of these approaches are outlined in the Paris Agreement, Parties 
still need to finalize the rules and guidance for operationalizing Article 6 as part of the so-
called ‘Paris Agreement rulebook’. While other elements of the ‘rulebook’ have already 
been agreed at COP24 in 2018, Parties were unable to reach agreement on the “Guidance 
for cooperative approaches” for Article 6.2, “Rules, modalities and procedures” for the 
Article 6.4 mechanism as well as the “Framework for NMA” of Article 6.8 at COP24 and 
COP25. At the latter in 2019,the Conference of the Parties serving as meeting of the Parties 
to the Paris Agreement (CMA) concluded with a procedural decision referencing three 
different proposals by the COP Presidency for the Art.6 decision texts as a basis for further 
negotiations at COP26 (see decision 9/CMA.2). 
Finalizing Art.6 rules is further complicated by the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2020, for the first 
time since the UNFCCC entered into force, neither COP nor subsidiary body meetings have 
been held. Current planning foresees COP26 in November 2021, with several preparatory 
meetings during 2021 and first informal virtual talks announced for November 2020. But 
the ongoing onslaught of the pandemic raises questions about when and how to finalize 
multilateral Article 6 rules. 
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Why a  Article 6 negotiations relevant for the East African region? First, a significant number 
of CDM projects and Programmes of Activities (PoA) have been registered in African host 
countries (UNEP DTU 2020). How these activities may be eligible and transition to the Paris 
Agreement context remains unclear. While the entry into force of the Doha Amendment 
to the Kyoto Protocol at the very last possible moment means the second commitment 
period of the Kyoto Protocol still becomes relevant and could generate demand for CDM 
credits until the end of the ‘true up’ period in 2023, the absence of clear regulation has 
significant implications on CDM transition, leading to high degree of uncertainty and risk for 
the East African project and PoA pipeline. This uncertainty is greatly amplified by the fact 
that, in the absence of a decision of the Conference and Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol (CMP), the CDM EB discusses the question of whether the CDM will continue 
all of its operations after 2020 controversially (see detailed discussion in section 2.3.3). 
Second, some Parties have already started piloting concrete Article 6 activities in Africa, 
including the East African region. This allows feeding practical experiences from regional 
piloting activities into the negotiations to ensure that Art. 6 rules reflect the circumstances 
and priorities of African countries and Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in order to 
prevent barriers to participation. Third, market mechanisms can generate contributions to 
adaptation finance (e.g. through a share of proceeds to the Adaptation Fund as under the 
CDM). 
Even though negotiations have been postponed, the discussion on Article 6 rules has 
continued in different informal virtual fora such as roundtables hosted by the European 
Roundtable on Climate Change and Sustainable Transition (ERCST), the climate change 
expert group (CCXG) of the OECD, virtual carbon market pavilion of the International 
Emissions Trading Association (IETA) or the Carbon Market Mechanisms working group 
(CMM WG) convened by Perspectives. While finalizing the negotiations through formal 
decisions is likely to still require physical meetings, virtual discussions can be important to 
resolve open issues even during the pandemic. It is therefore important that Eastern African 
negotiators follow and potentially engage in such discussions. 
Against this backdrop, this guidebook on Article 6 negotiations has two main objectives:
 • To facilitate understanding of Article 6 negotiation matters in an exhaustive yet 
simplified manner, tailored to the Eastern African context 
 • To strengthen negotiation language skills necessary for drafting text and eliciting 
support for East African positions through effective participation in the climate change 
negotiation meetings
This guidebook draws in part on recent work undertaken by Perspectives with the European 
Capacity Building Initiative (ECBI). The ECBI publishes and regularly updates studies 
and ‘pocket guides’ on issues related to UNFCCC negotiations1,  and has published a 
comprehensive study on Article 6 negotiations with regular updates (Michaelowa et al. 
2019; Michaelowa et al. forthcoming). The article 6 studies are informed by comments from 
negotiators and aim to reflect a balanced view of interpretations and negotiation positions. 
These and other useful resources that provide introductions and overviews to climate 
negotiations are listed in Annex I. 
1  The full list of pocket guides can be accessed here; the Article 6 study is available on Perspectives’ web-
site.
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Review of negotiations on 
Article 6 of the Paris Agreement
2.1 Historical evolution of Article 6 negotiations
 • The market mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol, in particular the CDM serve 
as source of experience on issues negotiated under Article 6.
 • Lessons can also be drawn from the historical carbon market experience. 
Carbon markets underwent several ‘ups’ and ‘downs’. The carbon market 
crash of 2011 shows the importance of sufficient, reliable demand and policy 
certainty for functioning carbon markets.
 • Market mechanisms are controversial in climate negotiations; hence, 
identifying technical solutions for competing political objectives among 
Parties (e.g. striking a balance between ensuring environmental integrity and 
keeping transaction costs reasonable) requires defining compromise options. 
 • While their adoption was initially scheduled for 2018, the ‘rulebook’ for the 
three Article 6 approaches are still being negotiated. The delay of UNFCCC 
negotiations due to the COVID-19 crisis has led to further delay in finalizing 
Article 6 rules. However, a group of 32 countries has agreed on common 
“San Jose principles” for Article 6 activities in order to avoid delaying 
implementation.
 • The key differences of the Paris mechanisms to the Kyoto mechanisms are 
(i) the commitment of all Parties to mitigation objectives posing challenges 
for accounting and additionality, (ii) limited international oversight of Article 
6.2 approaches and (iii) the introduction of new types of carbon market 
cooperation such as the crediting of sectoral measures and policy instruments
2.1.1.  Brief summary of negotiations leading to Article 6 
Market-based cooperative mechanisms were already introduced under the KP.2  Parties 
established three mechanisms: Joint Implementation (JI); Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) and International Emissions Trading (IET). The CDM is a multilaterally governed 
baseline and credit mechanism. It enables developed countries to achieve part of their 
objectives under the KP by purchasing carbon credits (Certified Emission Reductions, CERs) 
resulting from mitigation projects in developing countries that also contribute to sustainable 
development. Over time, the CDM has been reformed, e.g. by introducing programmatic 
approaches and simplified methodologies. It continues to evolve to this day, often with the 
objective to increase access by underrepresented countries. JI is a baseline and crediting 
2  Even before the adoption of the KP, so-called Activities Implemented Jointly were piloted under the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change. This program was crucial for the emergence of the Kyoto mecha-
nisms.
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mechanism for developed countries and those in transition that have emissions targets 
under the KP. IET covers trading of ‘Assigned Amount Units’ under developed countries’ 
KP commitments. 
The Kyoto mechanisms serve as sources of experience on issues negotiated under Article 
6. Since their inception, the use of market mechanisms has had ups and downs (see 
Figure 1). Lessons can also be drawn from observed carbon market dynamics, such as the 
carbon market crash from 2011 onwards which was caused by reduction of demand and an 
increase in supply, as well as a high degree of uncertainty about what international climate 
policy regime would succeed the Kyoto Protocol. 
Figure 1: “Ups” and “downs” of international carbon markets over time.
In international climate negotiations, market mechanisms are often controversially discussed, 
Source: Michaelowa et al. (2019b).
and it is often challenging to identify technical solutions for competing political objectives 
among Parties, such as ensuring the environmental integrity of mitigation outcomes while 
also keeping transaction costs and capacity requirements at a reasonable level. Catering to 
such different viewpoints also explains the balance between the three main components of 
Article 6 (cooperative approaches, multilateral mechanism, non-market approaches). 
These discussions have been evolving since the early days of the Kyoto Protocol. The 
CDM has been constantly reformed to address challenges and criticisms (Michaelowa et 
al. 2019; Shishlov and Bellassen 2012). In 2007 at the Bali conference, Parties decided to 
establish a new approach to enhance the domestic mitigation contribution by developing 
countries, so-called Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs). When negotiating 
the successor agreement to the KP, Parties pursued negotiations on market mechanisms in 
two tracks: the so-called ‘new market mechanism’ (NMM) and the ‘framework for various 
approaches’ (FVA) for bilateral cooperation and non-market-based initiatives. FVA was an 
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early placeholder for carbon markets not regulated by UNFCCC in order to avoid multilateral 
oversight and the need for consensus-based decision-making. This early structure 
continued to inform the Article 6 architecture of the Paris Agreement. While the negotiations 
took place for about five years (from 2010 to 2015), Article 6 in its final shape was only 
included late in the final PA at COP21.
2.1.2. Brief summary of Article 6 negotiations since COP21 until today
The PA defined high level principles for Article 6, but still required negotiators to specify 
technical details, which is still ongoing. Historically, the same happened under the KP with 
the detailed rules for the Kyoto mechanisms enshrined in the ‘Marrakech Accords’ of 2001. 
Parties continue to discuss ‘Guidance for Article 6.2’ and ‘Rules, Modalities and Procedures’ 
for Article 6.4. These Article 6 rules were initially scheduled to be adopted at CMA1 in 2018 
in order for to become operational in 2020.3  Yet, since the adoption of the Paris Agreement, 
Parties achieved only limited progress in fleshing out Article 6 rules. During COP24, the 
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) developed a first draft 
decision text. In the high-level segment during the second week of negotiations, the Polish 
COP presidency circulated different draft texts seeking to identify solutions for contentious 
points in the negotiations and suggestions to reduce the number of brackets in the text. 
However, Parties could not come to an agreement and deferred the decision to COP25 
based on three draft decision texts, one for Art. 6.2, 6.4 and 6.8 (Decision 8/CMA.1; 
Pouffary et al. 2019). 
Since it was already a priority for COP25 in 2019 to finalize Art.6, negotiations were pursued 
on the political level through Heads of Delegations meetings in parallel to the technical work 
in SBSTA since the first day of negotiations, which achieved considerable progress on key 
issues. In the high-level segment during the second week of negotiations, the Chilean 
COP Presidency convened informal roundtables to produce compromise negotiation text. 
Still, key contentious issues (see below) could not be resolved despite record ‘overtime’ 
of negotiations lasting almost two days beyond the official schedule. The CMA took a 
procedural decision which merely referenced three different versions of decision texts by 
the COP Presidency. Figure 2 and Figure 3 show the development of contentious negotiation 
issues. The grey circles show overarching negotiation ‘topics’ (e.g. accounting) to which 
specific negotiation issues are associated. It shows which negotiation issues were moved 
to a green ‘compromise zone’ between COP24 and COP25 and which ones are still highly 
contested (in red circle). Pending issues which might emerge as controversial are located 
in the yellow circle. 
The delay of UNFCCC negotiations due to the COVID-19 crisis has led to a further delay in 
finalizing Article 6 rules beyond 2020. As is generally valid in climate negotiations, if there is 
no agreement on all issues, any issue can be reopened (“Nothing is agreed until everything 
3  For a complete year by year summary, please refer to the archives of the Earth Negotiations Bulletin (ENB), 
which can be accessed online (in English and French) or the Negotiation Guide published by the Institut de la 
Francophonie pour le Developpement Durable on its website (in French and English).
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is agreed”). In absence of international rules, a group of 32 countries led by Costa Rica and 
Switzerland proposed common principles, the so called “San José Principles”, for the use of 
Article 6 mechanisms (DCC 2019). The practical implications for the future negotiations and 
implementation of pilots remain to be seen. However, no African country is represented in 
the group so far.
Figure 2: Contentious negotiation issues at COP24
The following subsections introduce key features, elements of convergence and open 
issues for each component of Article 6 and illustrate their relevance for Eastern Africa.
2.2.1. Cooperative approaches
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2.1.3. Key differences to the Kyoto Protocol
 The PA carbon markets show some key differences from the Kyoto mechanisms: 
 • Contrary to the KP, in which only industrialized country Parties committed to mitigation 
targets, all countries have agreed to make national contributions to reaching the 
mitigation target of the Paris Agreement. The targets are defined in countries’ NDCs, 
which are developed bottom-up and differ in many features (e.g. different metrics 
such as renewable energy or reforestation targets, as well as different target years and 
timeframes). The rules and modalities for Article 6 need to take this diversity into account. 
This poses important challenges regarding accounting for mitigation outcomes and 
additionality. Moreover, since all countries have NDCs, substantive interactions between 
Article 6 and the Enhanced Transparency Framework (ETF), for which the Modalities, 
Procedures and Guidelines (MPG) have been adopted in 2019 need to be considered. 
While the MPG include differentiated provisions for developing countries, in particular 
LDCs, all countries need to fully report on their participation in market mechanisms. This 
is especially relevant for Eastern African countries, whose NDCs demarcate conditional 
and unconditional targets, as countries can only sell mitigation outcomes which they do 
not need for the fulfilment of their unconditional NDC targets.
 • While the multilateral Article 6.4 mechanism will be governed through a Supervisory 
Body (SB) in a way similar to the CDM EB, cooperative approaches under Article 6.2 are 
subject only to limited international oversight. Consequently, transparency and reporting 
processes are central for ensuring the environmental integrity of Article 6.2.
 • PA mechanisms allow for new types of carbon market cooperation. They will go beyond 
project- and programme-based mitigation activities and include crediting of sectoral 
measures and policy instruments. New methodological approaches are required for 
these new types of carbon market activities.
2.2. Architecture of Article 6
 Key messages of section 2.2
 • Article 6 has three main components: cooperative approaches (Art. 6.2), a 
UNFCCC mechanism succeeding the CDM (Art. 6.4) and a framework for non-
market-based approaches (Art.6.8).
 • Cooperative approaches include the voluntary exchange of Internationally 
Traded Mitigation Outcomes (ITMOs) between Parties. These approaches 
offer flexibility in design and implementation by Parties with limited international 
supervision. Key principles are to apply robust accounting, avoid double 
counting of mitigation outcomes, promotion of sustainable development, 
ensure environmental integrity and transparency. The international accounting 
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and reporting framework is the cornerstone of the guidance for cooperative 
approaches that needs to be adopted at COP26. Accounting for transactions 
will be operationalized through so-called corresponding adjustments. While 
the basic principle is clear, the details of how Parties perform corresponding 
adjustments still need to be agreed.
 • The multilateral mechanism will generate carbon credits for mitigation activities 
authorized by host countries, which can be used towards the domestic NDC target 
or transferred internationally. The mechanism will be overseen by a Supervisory 
Board under multilateral oversight. The activity cycle will likely be similar to 
the CDM. In order to participate, host countries must have communicated a 
NDC and a DNA as focal point with potentially expanded oversight functions 
compared to CDM.
 • The framework for non-market based approaches under Article 6 does 
not define a mechanism or financing instrument and instead will combine 
approaches which do not involve the transfer of mitigation outcomes through 
market-based approaches. These could refer to mitigation, adaptation, finance, 
technology transfer, and capacity-building approaches. The negotiations on 
the Article 6.8 framework are largely overshadowed by negotiations on market-
based approaches. The main controversy is whether the framework will be 
permanently institutionalized within the UNFCCC architecture. 
Article 6.2 governs voluntary exchanges of Internationally Traded Mitigation Outcomes 
(ITMOs) between Parties to facilitate achieving NDCs, the so-called cooperative approaches. 
These approaches are not supervised by an international body and are characterised by a 
large flexibility in the design and implementation. They may include a broad range of activity 
types, ranging from bilaterally governed crediting mechanisms such as the Japanese Joint 
Crediting Mechanism (JCM)4  to mitigation policies (such as carbon taxes, emissions trading 
schemes (ETS), or renewable energy auctions). Another key application under Article 6.2 is 
the linking of ETS which does not generate new carbon credits but exchanges allowances 
between two ETS (Michaelowa et al. 2019). International guidance will be limited to the 
accounting and reporting of transactions.
Article 6.2 lays out key principles for cooperative approaches (see Box 1). Double counting, 
i.e. using or selling the same emission reduction towards two or more mitigation pledges, is a 
key risk to environmental integrity of cooperative approaches. Hence, a robust international 
accounting and transparency framework is the cornerstone of the Article 6.2 guidance. 
However, the differences among NDCs with regards to objectives, metrics used, timeframes 
and sectors covered makes developing common accounting rules extremely challenging. 
Nevertheless, points of convergence have emerged from the negotiations:
4  Most partner countries are Asian, but the JCM is also being used in Ethiopia and Kenya. These activities 
are presented in more detail in section 2.6.
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1. In the current negotiation text, ITMOs are defined as emission reductions resulting from 
an A6.2 approach, or from an A6.4 approach if they are internationally traded. A number 
of criteria will apply: ITMOs need to be real, verified, additional, and represent mitigation 
from 2021 onwards.
2. Parties using ITMOs need to account for them through so-called corresponding 
adjustments (CA). This means that parties selling mitigation outcomes internationally 
must subtract this mitigation outcome from the progress towards their own mitigation 
objectives (Michaelowa et al. 2019). The Party purchasing the ITMO can account it 
towards its target. Figure 3 illustrates the general principle of performing CA to the NDC 
target for seller and buyer countries. However, crucial questions such as when to apply 
CA, and how to account given diverse NDCs still remain to be solved (cf. section 2.3.1).
” Parties shall, where engaging on a voluntary basis in cooperative approaches 
that involve the use of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes towards 
nationally determined contributions, promote sustainable development and ensure 
environmental integrity and transparency, including in governance, and shall 
apply robust accounting to ensure, inter alia, the avoidance of double counting 
consistent with guidance adopted by the [CMA].”
Box 2: Article 6.2, Paris Agreement
Figure 4: Corresponding adjustments for sellers and buyers of mitigation outcomes
Source: adapted from Michaelowa et al. 2019
Country B. Buyer
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(3) While there is no international oversight of cooperative approaches, a transparent 
reporting and review cycle at UNFCCC level will allow to identify and call out approaches 
that do not meet the key agreed principles. The reporting provisions under the Article 
6.2 guidance are closely linked to the ETF under Article 13 of the PA. Parties have 
achieved significant progress on the reporting and review cycle at COP25 (see section 
2.3.2). 
Several East African countries, such as Rwanda, Ethiopia and Kenya have already been 
piloting crediting mechanisms under Article 6.2 approaches through the JCM and the 
World Bank’s Standardized Crediting Framework. Therefore, the design of rules and 
reporting requirements is of high relevance for these countries, which have expressed their 
commitment to robust accounting in their NDCs. Therefore, East African negotiators may 
consider this early experience from the region and bring it into finalizing Article 6.2 guidance. 
Moreover, special circumstances for LDCs have been invoked in both rule-making and 
implementation and East African negotiators may want to consider supporting these efforts 
(see 2.3.1; 2.3.6). 
2.2.2. The mechanism for sustainable development and mitigation (Article 6.4)
Article 6.4 establishes a multilaterally governed baseline and crediting mechanism, which 
may emerge as the successor to CDM. This mechanism will generate carbon credits 
(tentatively called Article 6.4 Emission Reductions, or A6.4ER) for mitigation activities 
authorized by host countries, which can be used towards the domestic NDC target or 
transferred internationally, which would make them ITMOs.
Box 3: Article 6.4, Paris Agreement
“A mechanism to contribute to the mitigation of [GHG] emissions and support 
sustainable development is hereby established under the authority and guidance of 
the [CMA] for use by Parties on a voluntary basis. It shall be supervised by a body 
designated by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to 
this Agreement, and shall aim:
 
(a)  To promote the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions while fostering 
sustainable development; 
(b)  To incentivize and facilitate participation in the mitigation of greenhouse gas    
emissions by public and private entities authorized by a Party; 
(c)  To contribute to the reduction of emission levels in the host Party, which will 
benefit from mitigation activities resulting in emission reductions that can also 
be used by another Party to fulfil its nationally determined contribution; and
(d)  To deliver an overall mitigation in global emissions.”
Several East African 
countries, such as 
Rwanda, Ethiopia and 
Kenya have already 
been piloting crediting 
mechanisms under 
Article 6.2
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At UNFCCC level, the mechanism will be overseen by the SB whose role is comparable to the 
CDM EB. It will register projects, oversee and approve the issuance of credits. Furthermore, 
it will approve eligible methodologies, in particular regarding the calculation of baselines 
and determining additionality. 
The activity cycle will likely be similar to the CDM in that activities must be approved by 
host countries and validated by independent auditors, accredited by UNFCCC (so-called 
Designated Operational Entities, DOE). Emission reductions will also have to be monitored 
and verified by independent auditors and are issued to accounts of the developers of the 
activities in a UNFCCC registry.
 




























Source: Michaelowa et al. (2019)
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Both public and non-governmental stakeholders can implement activities, as long as they 
obtain the approval of the host country. The host country must explain how its Article 6.4 
activities relate to its NDC and promote sustainable development (Michaelowa et al. 2019).
Furthermore, Parties have agreed on levying a share of proceeds (SOP) for the purposes 
of maintaining the SB and its support structure (administrative SOP) and for financing 
adaptation (e.g. contribution to the Adaptation Fund). While this is in principle agreed, it is 
not clear yet how the SOP will be operationalised (cf. section 2.3.4). In contrast to the CDM, 
a grievance and appeals process will be established.
The Art. 6.4 mechanism is of highest relevance for East African countries who host CDM 
activities and have generated experience and capacity with the CDM. The multilateral 
activity cycle and infrastructure (e.g. registry) ease pressure on host countries to build 
domestic capacity and infrastructure to deliver the same functions. Nevertheless, which 
governance functions are to be provided by the multilateral and the national level during 
implementation remains an open question. Special circumstances of LDCs and small island 
developing states (SIDS) needs to be considered in the operationalisation of the rules, e.g. 
more flexibility in developing baselines or testing additionality.
2.2.3. Framework for non-market approaches 
Article 6.8 and 6.9 establish a framework for non-market-based approaches (NMA) (see 
Box 3). Article 6.8 highlights importance of “integrated, holistic and balanced non-market 
approaches” to assist Parties in the implementation of their NDCs. NMAs can take various 
forms and refer to mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology transfer, and capacity-
building approaches (Michaelowa et al. 2019). Importantly, there is no clearly defined 
mechanism or financing instrument. Instead, Parties are negotiating a work programme 
to implement the framework, which is to be adopted at COP 26 as part of the ‘Article 6 
package’. However, the Article 6.8 framework is largely overshadowed by negotiations 
on market-based approaches. Compared to negotiations on Article 6.2 and 6.4, there is 
relatively high convergence in the negotiations. Still, issues can be reopened any time and/
or used as tactical ‘negotiation chips’. 
Box 4: Article 6.8 and 6.9, Paris Agreement
“8. Parties recognize the importance of integrated, holistic and balanced non-market approaches be-
ing available to Parties to assist in the implementation of their [NDCs], in the context of sustainable 
development and poverty eradication, in a coordinated and effective manner, including through, inter 
alia, mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology transfer and capacity-building, as appropriate. These 
approaches shall aim to: 
(a) Promote mitigation and adaptation ambition; 
(b) Enhance public and private sector participation in the implementation of nationally determined con-
tributions; and 
(c) Enable opportunities for coordination across instruments and relevant institutional arrangements.  
9. A framework for non-market approaches to sustainable development is hereby defined to promote 
the non-market approaches referred to in paragraph 8 of this Article.”
Article 6.8 and 6.9 
establish a framework 
for non-market-based 
approaches (NMA) 
(see Box 3). 
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The main controversy surrounding Article 6.8 concerns its institutional character. Some 
Parties fear that a strong framework might duplicate existing efforts, e.g. on adaptation, 
technology transfer, finance and might come with an increased pressure on industrialized 
countries to provide climate finance. The African Group is part of a coalition in favour of a 
work program that is permanently institutionalized within the UNFCCC architecture.
The negotiations under Article 6.8 have high relevance for Eastern Africa: Possible 
designs of approaches could cover the provision of climate finance for projects which 
are underrepresented in current market-based activities. This could concern for example 
adaptation and mitigation projects which are not easily quantifiable (e.g. technology 
transfer). The African-led Adaptation Benefit Mechanism (ABM) is one example for a 
potential activity under the framework, with early support from Uganda through a formal 
submission to UNFCCC proposing to integrate the ABM into the UNFCCC (see section 2.4). 
2.3. Key negotiation issues
         Key messages of section 2.3
 • Defining common rules on robust accounting is difficult given the diversity of NDC features. Accounting 
questions are at the centre of most controversial negotiation issues. There are two key issues for 
NDCs with different target types: For NDCs expressed in metrics other than CO2e, Parties apply a 
corresponding adjustment for relevant indicator if the same indicator is used by both Parties. There is also 
disagreement on what constitutes an emission reduction ‘ outside the NDC’ and whether corresponding 
adjustments apply for ITMOs used for ‘other purposes’. Moreover, there are different rules for developed 
and developing countries, and special flexibilities for LDCs.
 • The reporting and review obligations for Parties using Article 6 approaches comprise: (i) an initial report 
before the start of an activity; (ii) annual information on ITMO accounting and (iii) regular information every 
two years on participation in Article 6 approaches, the country’s emissions balance and corresponding 
adjustments, in line with the ETF. UNFCCC will host a ’Centralized Accounting and Reporting Platform’ 
(CARP) which assembles information on Article 6 activities. Reports will be evaluated by an Article 6 
Technical Expert Review (A6TER). While there is little disagreement on the reporting and review cycle, 
there is uncertainty about practical steps for Parties. 
 • CDM transition to Article 6 remains highly contentious. While there was initial controversy between ‘full 
transition’ and ‘no transition’, significant progress has been achieved on all elements of CDM transition 
(infrastructure/methodologies, activities and units). However, the absence of finalized rules at the end of 
the second KP commitment period creates a regulatory gap regarding continuity of the CDM after 2020. 
At COP25, CMA could not agree on guidance to the CDM EB with regard to matters of CDM transition.
 • While the share of proceeds for adaptation under Article 6.4 is not controversial, Parties need to 
determine how and when it will be levied. Options include monetary fees at registration or issuance or 
diverting a fixed percentage of units at issuance, or a mix of both. Whether a SOP will appy to ITMO 
transfers under Article 6.2 is highly contentious. Some Parties, including AGN, argue that it ensures 
sufficient and equitable funding for adaptation avoids disadvantaging the multilateral mechanism, others 
argue that it would not be technically feasible given the diversity of Article 6.2 approaches.
 • How to interpret OMGE, as well as the approaches included in the negotiation to determine baselines and 
additionality are further topics which have been less controversial in the negotiations at COP25, but on 
which no agreement has been found. They may thus be re-opened at any moment.
The following section 
provides more detail 
on key issues that 
need to be resolved 
in order to be able to 
finalize the Article 6.2 
guidance and Article 
6.4 rules, modalities 
and procedures (RMP). 
There are important 
technical linkages 
between Article 6.2 
and Article 6.4 and 
several of the key 
negotiation issues 
are relevant for both 
Article 6.2 and 6.4. 
These issues are only 
relevant for Art. 6.2 
and 6.4, but not 6.8 
since NMAs will not 
generate ITMOs.
Article 6 Negotiations Handbook for Eastern Africa22
2.3.1. Accounting 
While there is agreement on the basic principle for robust accounting and avoiding double 
counting (see section 2.2.1), different characteristics used to define NDC by Parties as 
described in Box 4 make defining a common accounting approach extremely challenging. 
Accounting questions are at the centre of most controversial negotiation issues (Michaelowa 
et al. 2019). The main open questions are how to account for different time frames and 
metrics of NDCs, when corresponding adjustments will apply, and whether the use of 
mitigation outcomes for ‘other purposes’, such as voluntary market activities need to be 
accounted for. While Parties found common ground on the first two issues during COP25, 
positions on the latter two questions differ considerably. An additional negotiation issue with 
relevance for several Eastern African countries concerns the differentiation of accounting 
rules for LDCs and SIDS.
How can accounting be operationalized given different time frames of NDCs?
Whether a country has pledged that it will achieve an emission reduction in a certain year 
in the future (single-year-target) or has communicated an emissions trajectory throughout 
the entire period of the NDC (multi-year target) makes an important difference for the 
accounting approaches for ITMOs that can be used. While accounting for corresponding 
adjustments between two countries with multi-year target NDCs (e.g. having defined an 
emissions trajectory) is relatively straightforward, accounting for single year targets is 
more difficult. The accounting approach needs to ensure that the transfer of ITMOs prior 
to the target year is properly accounted. If this is not ensured, Parties with a single year 
target might be incentivized to transfer emission reductions achieved earlier to the target 
Box 5: Differences in NDC characteristics
Scope of the NDC: economy-wide vs. covering certain sectors
Type of NDC target: absolute emission targets; emission targets relative to (a) a base year level, (b) a 
static BAU scenario, (c) a dynamic BAU scenario; intensity targets relating to GDP or other parameters; 
non-greenhouse gas (GHG) targets (e.g. quantity of non-fossil or renewable energy, energy efficiency 
improvement, forest cover, etc.); policy or action targets.
Targets can be defined for multiple or single years during the NDC period. Some targets are quantified 
ex-ante, while others are only quantifiable ex-post.
NDC metrics: Metrics can take the form of CO2e or other units (e.g. energy units (GWh) or renewable 
electricity production capacities (MW), etc.)
Time frames: Parties have so far not agreed on common time frames for NDCs, so the time frames 
covered diverge. Most countries use 10 years, some five years.
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year, which violates environmental integrity (see Figure 5). Parties’ positions seem to 
converge on two accounting approaches for single-year-targets. In the future, Parties 
can propose further accounting approaches for approval by the CMA.
 • Development of one or several multi-year emissions trajectory(ies) for the NDC 
implementation period or a multi-year emission budget. This allows Parties to apply 
annual adjustments comparably to a multi-year NDC (see Figure 6).
 • The Party calculates an average of the ITMOs it transfers and acquires throughout 
the NDC implementation period. This allows the Party to undertake annual ‘indicative’ 
adjustments equal to this average amount and a ‘final’ CA in the NDC single target 
year (see Figure 7). 
Figure 6: Environmental integrity risk of accounting for single-year targets
Source: based on Michaelowa et al. (2019)
Figure 7: Corresponding Adjustments under a multi-year trajectory
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Figure 8: ‘Averaging approach’ to CA for a single-year target
Source: adapted from Michaelowa et al. (forthcoming)
How can accounting be operationalized given expression of NDCs in different metrics?
As not all NDCs have targets expressed in CO2e (e.g. renewable energy or reforestation 
targets), some Parties argue that requiring the expression of ITMOs in terms of CO2 restricts 
the accessibility of Article 6. While extensive experience exists for trading mitigation 
outcomes expressed in CO2e, new solutions would need to be found to operationalize 
corresponding adjustments for ITMOs expressed in other metrics. Some Parties oppose 
this in order to allow for transparent accounting, and any target type could in principle be 
converted into GHG denomination. The significance that Parties attach to this topic varies, 
and the substantive relevance of the topic may be limited. The current draft lays out a 
process for performing corresponding adjustments in a ‘buffer registry’, and SBSTA will 
have to elaborate further guidance, including on methods for conversion (Vivid Economics 
and Perspectives Climate Group 2020):
 • Ideally, participating Parties need to have defined the NDC in the same other metric as 
the ITMO. Every Party needs to report the relevant indicator for this metric in annual 
levels. It is this indicator that will be used by the Parties to track progress of NDC 
implementation.
 • If the ITMO and NDC metric do not correspond, participating Parties must apply 
a corresponding adjustment only to the relevant NDC ‘portion’, which has to be 
quantified in the same metric as the ITMO.
 • Corresponding adjustments are then performed against this reported annual ‘level’     
of the indicator.
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Figure 9: Corresponding Adjustments for Non-GHG Metrics
Figure 10: Common (left) vs.  alternative (right) understanding of “outside the NDC”
Source: Michaelowa et al. (forthcoming)
Will CA apply to mitigation outcomes generated ‘outside’ of the NDC sectors?
This question remains highly controversial as there is no agreement (1) on the definition 
of ‘outside’ of the NDC; and (2) there is no agreement on whether or not accounting is 
required for activities ‘outside’ the NDC, provided there is an additionality assessment. 
Regarding the first controversy, most countries use sectors and gases covered by the NDC 
as reference point for measuring progress towards NDC achievement. ‘Outside of the NDC’ 
then means sectors and gases not covered by the NDC (see left part of Figure 4). A few 
countries oppose this understanding and consider any mitigation action beyond the NDC 
target to be ‘outside the NDC’ (see right part of Figure 4). No compromise was found and 
the current text includes reference to sectors and gases. For LDCs this issue is important if 
their NDCs do not cover all sectors, and as some NDCs do not include the LULUCF sector.
Source: Michaelowa et al. (2019)
Article 6 Negotiations Handbook for Eastern Africa26
 Regarding the second controversy, as per the most recent negotiation text on Article 6.2 
guidance, the transfer of mitigation outcomes shall trigger a corresponding adjustment 
(to the emission balance on emission sources covered by the NDC), whether or not the 
underlying mitigation was itself achieved in sectors or GHGs covered by the NDC (Vivid 
Economics and Perspectives Climate Group 2020). Parties against the accounting for 
actions outside of the NDC put forward that this provides disincentives to pursue mitigation 
in sectors outside the NDC. Parties in favour argue that exemptions might disincentivize the 
expansion of NDCs. There might be exemptions for the international transfer of A6.4ERs 
that are issued ‘outside’ of an NDC within the first NDC implementation period5  (Vivid 
Economics and Perspectives Climate Group 2020). 
Differences to use of carbon markets for domestic and non-NDC related purposes 
(voluntary carbon market, CORSIA)
Important ITMO demand in the short term may come from airlines that are required to 
offset part of their emissions under CORSIA (albeit now being constrained by the slump 
in international air travel triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic) and the voluntary market. 
However, there is a risk of ‘double claiming’ of ITMOs if these are not accounted for. 
Therefore, Parties agree that the use of ITMOs for ’other purposes’ than achievement of 
the NDC target will trigger a CA. How the accounting to be performed depends on whether 
the definition of ITMOs includes credits traded on voluntary markets and the trigger for 
corresponding adjustments. For example, it is unclear whether the authorisation or the use 
of an ITMO ‘for other purposes’ will trigger a corresponding adjustment and whether the 
host country will be able to determine if the voluntary use of an ITMO can be considered an 
‘other purpose’. Carbon credits used under CORSIA will certainly require a corresponding 
adjustment if the credit was generated since CORSIA is also a multilateral mechanism.
Differentiation of rules for LDCs6  
Accounting requires important capacities with regard to institutional structure, the 
elaboration of methodologies, maintenance of a registry, regular reporting, etc. Experience 
with the CDM shows that this is a barrier to the accessibility of such mechanisms for 
LDCs. Therefore, in the CDM, special provisions regarding eligibility, the simplified the 
use of methodologies, or buyer restrictions applied to LDCs. The PA establishes different 
rules for developed and developing countries, but goes further in recognizing the special 
circumstances of LDCs in light of their limited historical responsibility and high climate 
vulnerability. Such differentiated rules also apply to the operationalisation of Article 6, 
e.g. through more flexibility in accounting and reporting. While concrete proposals for this 
flexibility are not included in the negotiation texts, this may become crucial when elaborating 
detailed technical rules.
5 Cf. Chapter IX of the annex of all three iterations of the Presidency text on Article 6.4.
6 The authors are mindful that not all Eastern African countries are LDCs or that they may graduate from that 
status soon. Still, differentiation has been and will be a prominent topic in Article 6 rules, therefore it is import-
ant to pay special attention to this .
Accounting requires 
important capacities 
with regard to institutional 
structure, the elaboration 
of methodologies, 
maintenance of a registry, 
regular reporting, etc
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2.3.2. Reporting and review
Parties using Article 6 approaches will have three reporting obligations: An Initial Report 
which will be submitted before the start of an activity. It contains information on the metric 
of ITMOs used, the application of corresponding adjustments, quantified information on 
mitigation, a description of the approach and the fulfilment of participation responsibilities. 
After the initial report, parties submit annual information on ITMO accounting, as well as 
regular Information every two years on their participation in approaches, their emission 
balance and corresponding adjustments. This will be included in the Biennial Transparency 
Reports (BTR), which contains the information to be reported as per the Enhanced 
Transparency Framework (Art. 13). The annual information on ITMO accounting may also 
be included in the BTR. Paragraph 77(d) of the ETF Modalities, Procedures and Guidelines 
defines minimum reporting standards for the annual emissions balance of sources and 
sinks, which must be aligned with reporting on Article 6 activities. However, they will only 
become operationalized once there is agreement on reporting on cooperative approaches.
Figure 11: Article 6 reporting requirements and linkage with reporting under the ETF
Source: authors
UNFCCC will host a ’Centralized Accounting and Reporting Platform’ (CARP) which 
assembles information on Article 6 activities that are provided in biennial transparency 
reports, such as a description of each cooperative approach, the expected mitigation 
outcomes and the participating Parties involved, public information on ITMOs, and all non-
confidential information submitted by Parties in the context of their reporting obligations. 
The CARP will include non-confidential information submitted by Parties and also contain 
UNFCCC will host a 
’Centralized Accounting 
and Reporting Platform’ 
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an Article 6 database with information on activities and corresponding adjustments, 
annual emission balances and information on UNFCCC will host a ’Centralized Accounting 
and Reporting Platform’ (CARP) which assembles information on Article 6 activities that 
are provided in biennial transparency reports, such as a description of each cooperative 
approach, the expected mitigation outcomes and the participating Parties involved, public 
information on ITMOs, and all non-confidential information submitted by Parties in the 
context of their reporting obligations. The CARP will include non-confidential information 
submitted by Parties and also contain an Article 6 database with information on activities 
and corresponding adjustments, annual emission balances and information on ITMOs. 
For Parties that are not in a position to set up a national registry for tracking ITMOs, the 
UNFCCC Secretariat will set up a multilateral registry with the same functions that national 
registries need to perform.
Reports will be evaluated by an Article 6 Technical Expert Review (A6TER). The information 
submitted by Parties will be reviewed by the technical experts regarding the consistency of 
information submitted, who may also provide recommendations. The reports of the A6TER 
will be forwarded for consideration under the ETF. Furthermore, the secretariat is requested 
to periodically compile a synthesis of review reports. 
Reporting is of central relevance for Article 6.2 approaches, as there is no multilateral 
supervision. While Parties have already found common ground on many issues regarding 
the reporting and review process (see above), two open questions remain:
 • Will the mandate of the A6TER only check that reporting procedures and 
communication of CA are correctly observed by the Party or also examine 
environmental integrity and robustness of accounting?
 • Will the Secretariat have the mandate to perform consistency checks in the CARP?
While there is little disagreement on the reporting and review cycle, Parties have high 
uncertainty about what the reporting under Article 6 and the ETF will look like in practice. 
Since Article 6 reporting is so closely interlinked with the ETF, Parties need to ensure 
consistency across their reporting. Many reporting requirements are optional or include 
flexibility provision, but since participation in market mechanisms is voluntary, participating 
Parties will be required to report more comprehensively and consistently. This may 
emerge as an important practical challenge for Eastern African participation in Article 6. 
Negotiators and decision makers therefore need to understand which reporting processes 
and infrastructure for market approaches need to be established at the national level (e.g. 
to keep an inventory, how to authorize ITMO transfers and what the consequences are etc) 
and for which ones the international infrastructure (e.g. CARP, incl. Article 6 registry, etc) 
can be used or flexibility provisions applied. For example, while some East African countries 
may not need to establish a full-fledged national Article 6 registries for tracking carbon 
credits given the resource requirements, a well-established national GHG inventory and 
annual emission balances will probably be necessary.
Reports will be 
evaluated by an Article 
6 Technical Expert 
Review (A6TER). 
The information 
submitted by Parties 
will be reviewed 
by the technical 
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the consistency of 
information submitted, 
who may also provide 
recommendations
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2.3.3. Transition of CDM activities 
Under the CDM, the Executive Board and DNAs gained experience with developing 
methodologies and standards for international market mechanisms, registering projects, 
generating and issuing credits. The CDM has a large portfolio of projects and programmes 
of activities, in which significant investments have been made, even though some CDM 
activities are dormant due to the low CER price on the secondary carbon market. Despite 
high uncertainties, the potential accumulated CER supply is estimated by many to reach 
several billion tCO2e (Michaelowa et a. 2019). As of October 2020, the EAA member 
countries jointly host 103 CDM activities (projects and programmes of activities (PoAs)), 
which have generated 15.3 million CERs, with an additional potential of generating 1.1 million 
CERs by 2020 (UNEP DTU 2020).
CDM transition to Article 6 is a highly contentious issue in the negotiations. There was 
longstanding opposition between Parties in favour of ‘full transition’ vs. Parties in favour of 
‘no transition’. Parties opposing the CDM transition point to the huge surplus of pre-2020 
CERs which – unless governments would increase demand significantly – would result in 
an oversupply which would keep prices low for years and would undermine investments in 
new mitigation actions. They also point at the low environmental integrity of many credits 
from existing CDM activities in the global portfolio regarding the lack of additionality and 
low social and environmental co-benefits, such as large hydropower plants, destruction of 
industrial gases, or efficient coal power. Some Parties fear that CDM transition could also 
be a justification for industrialised countries to transfer Kyoto surplus allowances into the 
NDC implementation period. Parties in favour of a ‘full transition’ argue that there is a need 
to preserve existing mitigation investments and their mitigation contribution. Overall, a well-
organized transition from the CDM to Article 6 based on clearly defined eligibility criteria 
that meet all PA requirements would be a trust enhancing measure sending a signal to the 
private sector that a UNFCCC market mechanism cannot just ’switch off’ activities with valid 
crediting periods (Michaelowa et al. 2019). This is particularly relevant for the East African 
CDM portfolio, which has a comparatively high share of projects with strong sustainable 
development benefits, which were often only recently registered. It is also clear that the 
interest of those Parties opposing CDM transition is not focused on the still comparatively 
small African share of the global CDM portfolio, but directed at large emerging economies 
who are expected to contribute larger domestic efforts instead of being able to sell their 
mitigation outcomes. 
However, significant progress has been achieved at COP25 and Parties converged on textual 
proposals for compromise on fundamental aspects. They agree that there should be a well-
organized process that avoids a regulatory gap for mitigation activities and recognizes the 
balance that needs to be struck between preserving the trust of market actors and ensuring 
the ambition and integrity of activities that generate mitigation outcomes during the NDC 
implementation periods (Hoch et al. 2020). The transition of the CDM to the multilateral 
mechanism pursuant to Article 6.4 comprises three elements. The current negotiation 
status for all three aspects is summarized in Table 1. 
However, significant 
progress has been 
achieved at COP25 
and Parties converged 
on textual proposals 
for compromise on 
fundamental aspects.
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Table 1: Transition of CDM methodologies, activities and units to Article 6.4
Transition of CDM 
methodologies
Transition of CDM activities Transition of CDM units
The Supervisory Body reviews 
methodologies in use for the 
CDM and other existing market-
based mechanisms with a view 
to applying them with revisions 
as appropriate for activities of the 
mechanism. 
The Supervisory Body reviews 
the CDM accreditation 
standards and procedures 
with a view to applying them with 
revisions as appropriate by 2021.
When an activity is eligible for 
transition, it may continue to 
apply the currently approved 
CDM methodology either until 
of the end of its current crediting 
period or until 31 December 
2023, whichever is earlier. 
Afterwards, it shall apply an A6.4M 
methodology.
The transition of activities is 
allowed following an eligibility 
check, in line with future 
CMA decisions and relevant 
requirements adopted by the 
Supervisory Body.
SBSTA is tasked with developing 
criteria for the transition 
of activities, the steps for 
implementation of the transition 
and a fast track procedure for 
small-scale activities and PoAs 
(to be adopted by the CMA).
Before an activity can be re-
registered under the Article 6.4 
mechanism, the host Party needs 
to communicate its approval.
The transition shall have been 
completed no later than 2023.
The transitioned activity may 
continue to apply the CDM 
methodology until the earlier end 
of its current crediting period or 31 
December 2023.
A6.4ERs may be issued for 
emission reductions achieved 
after 31 December 2020, 
in line with the guidance on 
corresponding adjustments. 
With regard to the transition of 
units, one controversial question 
remains: Can CERs generated 
before 2020 be used for 
compliance with NDC targets?
There is a strong opposition 
between countries opposing 
the use of any credits generated 
before 2020 and countries with 
a large amount of CDM credits, 
revenues from which they do not 
want to lose.
However, there is consensus that 
this issue should not be deferred 
to a work programme.
Compromise solutions could be 
a cut-off date in 2015/2016 with 
the entry into force of PA and a 
restriction of the period in which 
‘old credits can be used (e.g. 2025 
or 2030), but no compromise 
was found so far. 
Source: based on Hoch et al. (2020)
Open questions and the regulatory gap in 2020 
With regard to the transition of methodologies, it remains open what criteria should 
determine the eligibility and revisions of methodologies before they qualify as Article 6.4 
mechanism methodologies, and what added value the review of methodologies of other 
market mechanisms will bring. First and foremost, however, it is questionable whether the 
process and in particular the timeline will be feasible. Given that COP26 has been deferred 
to 2021, the indicative timeline agreed on by Parties (Table 1) will have to be revised. It is 
important for East Africa to reflect on how to support the transition of the project types 
and associated methodologies that have been most relevant under the CDM regionally (in 
particular AMS-II.G and AMS-I.E for cook stoves, and ACM2 and AMS-I.D for renewable 
energy), and to prioritize supporting their transition.
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Together with the fact that the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol ends in 
2020, this creates a regulatory gap as the rules for how to meet NDC targets have not yet 
been finalized. This creates uncertainty for example on how the CDM EB and the SB may 
share responsibilities. At COP25, the CMP could not agree on guidance to the CDM EB on 
how to continue its functions beyond 2020. There is controversy between proponents of 
stopping CER issuances for post-2020 mitigation outcomes and to renew crediting periods 
after 2020 and proponents of continuing CDM activities. This also raises the question of 
whether it makes sense for project developers and DNAs to support the development of 
new CDM activities, even though a replacement is not yet in place. Moreover, it creates 
uncertainty about how Article 6.4 infrastructure will be able to build on operational CDM 
infrastructure such as the CDM registry and UNFCCC Secretariat support structure. 
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2.3.4. Share of proceeds and adaptation finance
Under the CDM, a share of proceeds (SOP) was levied (i) for administrative purposes and 
(ii) and for adaptation (Box 5). The SOP for adaptation leveraged important contributions to 
the Adaptation Fund. 
Parties can rely on the experiences from the CDM, to draw lessons learned regarding 
advantages and disadvantages of monetary vs. in-kind SOP (for a detailed discussion see 
Michaelowa et al. 2019a)
Box 6: Share of proceeds under the CDM
Administrative share of proceeds: 
 • monetary
 • financing EB operation and maintenance of registry infrastructure for example
 • levied upon credit issuance
Share of proceeds for adaptation:
 • in kind (2% share of carbon credits)
 • provided to the Adaptation Fund
 • levied on credit issuance
An international levy on mitigation outcomes generated by international market mechanisms 
has been discussed under the Article 6 mechanisms. While a share of proceeds will apply 
to the multilateral mechanism of Article 6.4 to cover administrative expenses and contribute 
to financing adaptation, a possible contribution of activities under Article 6.2 to adaptation 
finance is highly controversial. Even if the applicability of a SOP under Article 6.4 is not in 
question, the exact modalities are still being discussed. There are different options how to 
levy the SOP: 
 • A monetary fee to be paid at registration and/or issuance. The advantage is that 
monetary fees provide for a stable income, even in times of low market prices. 
 • A fixed percentage of units issued could be withheld at issuance and transferred to a 
separate UNFCCC account. The units can then be sold on the international market by 
UNFCCC or a trustee. 
 • A hybrid mix of monetary fees and a share of the mitigation outcomes could be levied. 
Income from fees and from the sale of mitigation outcomes would then be distributed 
among the administrative institutions and the Adaptation Fund.
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The question of whether a SOP will be applicable to ITMO transfers under Article 6.2 is 
highly contentious. The absence of a SOP in the original text of Article 6.2 in the PA is 
being interpreted differently. Some Parties stress that there is no mandate to introduce 
an additional levy, while others argue that this does not prevent the CMA to adopt new 
decisions. Some Parties are opposed to raising adaptation finance from Article 6.2 activities 
as this would represent a disincentive that would not be technically feasible given the 
diversity of potential approaches. Other Parties, including the AGN, support an adaptation 
levy on Article 6.2 as they want to ensure sufficient funding for adaptation and an equitable 
contribution by all Parties. They also have the concern that the Article 6.4 mechanism might 
be disadvantaged if the SOP is not applied to ‘competing’ bilateral cooperative approaches 
under Article 6.2.
It is also contested who should benefit from a contribution to adaptation finance. The AGN 
and other Parties are strongly in favour of contributing to the UNFCCC Adaptation Fund 
where countries are equitably represented, while other Parties oppose a binding beneficiary 
and want to have flexibility to support other bilateral and multilateral funds or activities.
So far, only the SOP for adaptation has been discussed in the context of Article 6, however, 
the maintenance of the Article 6 database, the organisation of the A6TER, the provision of a 
registry to track ITMOs and related tasks for the Secretariat will also generate administration 
costs and capacity requirements which suggest that an administrative SOP may be required. 
Moreover, host countries will also face administrative costs for implementing cooperative 
approaches.  (Michaelowa et al. 2019)
Lastly, when designing a SOP for both under Articles 6.4 and 6.2 is discussed, an important 
question is the point at which it is levied. Under 6.4, at the point of issuance of credits would 
be the easiest option. However, under Article 6.2, there is no international issuance. Either 
the SOP can be levied at the point of the international transfer for both mechanisms, or two 
different points of levy can be agreed for 6.4 and 6.2. This has high practical importance 
for EAA member countries who are establishing Art.6.2 institutional capacity, since the 
expanded oversight functions could potentially be financed through an administrative SOP 
on resulting ITMOs.
A highly relevant recent development that strengthens the argument for a SOP applied to 
Art.6.2 is that the ratification threshold for the Doha Agreement has been finally exceeded 
in October 2020, meaning it enters into force before the end of the year. A little-known 
aspect of this Agreement is that it expands the SOP from CDM to Joint Implementation and 
International Emissions Trading. While this may not have much relevance for raising actual 
adaptation finance during the KPCP2 as the dominant majority of carbon credit transactions 
was through the CDM, it cements the agreed understanding that all international market 
mechanisms are subject to an SOP – which makes it hard to argue why it should not apply 
to Art. 6.2. 
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2.3.5. Overall mitigation in global emissions
Article 6.4 mandates that the new mechanism shall deliver ’overall mitigation of global 
emissions’ (OMGE) (see Box 2). However, Parties do not share the same understanding of 
this principle, which challenges its operationalisation. Some see OMGE as a ‘side benefit’, 
referring to either the general ambition increases of NDCs triggered by the availability of 
cheap ITMOs through Article 6, or the fact that additionality of activities under Article 6 
or conservativeness of baselines is ensured by robust rules (Michaelowa et al. 2019). A 
different interpretation regards OMGE as a separate requirement that can be implemented 
through cancelling A6ER. This would mean that a certain part of the emission reductions 
achieved would be cancelled, either mandatorily or voluntarily in the context of results-
based climate finance (Michaelowa et al. 2019). 
Parties do not agree on whether OMGE should apply only to emission reductions generated 
under Article 6.4 or also to ITMO transfers under Article 6.2. The draft negotiation 
texts include options that would lead to either an encouraged (voluntary) or mandatory 
cancellation of a certain share of ITMOs transferred under Article 6.2. (Vivid Economics 
and Perspectives Climate Group 2020). In the past year there has been relatively little 
progress on these positions. 
2.3.6. Baselines and methodologies
Key approaches in draft negotiation texts
Methodologies are important for establishing baselines, monitoring emission reductions 
and determining their additionality. These are key steps which determine the eligibility of a 
proposed carbon market activity for Article 6 and may have strong impacts on the amount 
of ITMOs/A64ER as well as their environmental integrity
Box 7: Additionality
The concept of additionality stipulates that in the context of crediting mechanisms any mitigation activity 
needs to demonstrate that the activity (and thus the resulting mitigation) would not have happened in 
the absence of the revenue from the sale of emissions units created by the market-based mechanism. 
Additionality is important to prevent the generation of fictitious carbon credits and thus for ensuring 
environmental integrity and ensuring the efficient allocation of funds. Additionality has historically been 
checked through investment or barrier tests, which were subject to criticism of subjectivity. Recently, 
positive lists of technologies seen as automatically additional have gained ground.
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Under Article 6.2 cooperative approaches, baselines and additionality will be determined 
by the cooperating Parties who have an obligation to report in their BTRs how each 
cooperative approach ensures environmental integrity. The additionality of each Article 6 
activity needs to be determined. Given that host country policies were explicitly excluded 
from additionality tests in the CDM, as mitigation in developing countries was strictly 
voluntary, these approaches need to be fundamentally rethought in order to consider the 
new circumstance that all countries have NDCs. If the NDC of the transferring country 
is not ambitious, credits generated based on this NDC might not actually represent an 
emission reduction that results from a mitigation action (see Box 6). Thus, crediting of 
non-additional activities violates the principle of environmental integrity. If such credits 
are traded or claimed against NDC targets by the host Party, then total global emissions 
increase as a result, undermining environmental integrity. A key question is thus whether if 
the Supervisory Body will assess additionality only against the NDC or through investment 
or other tests (Michaelowa et al. 2019).
In order to meet Article 6 design principles, methodologies need to apply conservative 
baselines that take into account all existing policies and address potential leakage. 
Furthermore, the risk of non-permanence i.e. reversals of emission removals need to be 
addressed (Vivid Economics and Perspectives Climate Group 2020). For the Article 6.4 
mechanism, baselines and methodologies are likely to be approved by the Supervisory 
Body, although it is possible that host country DNAs will play a role in ensuring the integrity of 
methodologies or country-specific parameters that influence baseline or activity scenarios. 
Several options for general baseline principles such as variations of a ‘best available 
technology’ approach or business as usual scenarios, are being discussed. At COP25, the 
text developed significantly; Parties tried to come up with language that balances several 
key principles. These go beyond the requirements for baselines under the CDM, but also 
provide flexibility to parties. On the one hand, baselines should reflect the ambition of the 
PA, which could be specified by a crediting threshold or ‘ambitious’ baseline ‘below BAU’ 
(which does not provide full crediting against a BAU scenario). Baselines have to contribute 
to emission reductions and/or removals and be consistent with the NDC of the host Party 
and the PA objectives. 
It should be noted that the calculation of baselines on all levels of aggregation (project, 
programme, sectoral, etc.) relies heavily on data availability, which can be a barrier for 
participating in the mechanism. Therefore,  baseline approaches should always be able to 
take into account host countries’ differing contexts. Parties discuss several text proposals:
 
 • All baselines must take into account relevant circumstances (e.g. national, regional, 
local)
 • Justification of the choice of baseline
 • Baseline setting approaches based on best available technology baselines or 
performance benchmarks should be the main options (or default approach), but 
others (e.g. BAU, standardized baselines) can be chosen if not ‘economically or 
technologically viable’
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Such flexibility provisions should cater for different capacities of countries, although it needs 
to be ensured that they will not be exploited as loopholes for middle- or high-income host 
countries. An additional option to address diverging capacities of cooperating countries 
would be the development of standardized baselines by the SB. This approach already 
exists under the CDM and most EAA member countries have successfully developed 
standardized baselines for the CDM
Differences between CDM and Article 6 baselines and methodologies
While the CDM and JI can be clearly understood as predecessors of cooperative 
approaches and the multilateral mechanism, there are two fundamental differences. 
First, both new approaches include the possibility of crediting emission reductions 
generated by policy instruments or on a sectoral level. This means that parties engaging 
in cooperative approaches (for Article 6.2 approaches) or the SB for the multilateral Article 
6.4 mechanism will develop an entirely new set of methodologies for such approaches 
that were not practiced in CDM and JI. Secondly, baseline and additionality determination 
have to be undertaken in the context of host countries’ NDCs (Michaelowa et al. 2019c). 
When engaging in a cooperative approach, host countries must determine which mitigation 
outcomes they need to achieve their national pledges and which ones can be traded 
internationally. ITMOs need to exceed unconditional NDC targets, which are to be achieved 
and accounted for domestically. Conditional NDC elements, however, are in principle likely 
to be eligible for generating ITMOs provided the respective activity is additional. The quality 
of the NDC and the institutional capacity to determine which mitigation outcomes can be 
traded without undermining environmental integrity are crucial preconditions for generating 
a ‘good quality’ ITMO.
An additional potential issue that is currently not mentioned in the draft decision texts, but 
particularly relevant for Eastern African countries is a baseline approach called suppressed 
demand. Such baselines allow to consider scenarios in which future anthropogenic 
emissions are projected to increase as access to basic services (such as electricity supply 
for households, cooking energy or access to water) has historically not been provided 
at adequate levels to local populations. In such cases, a CDM activity might not reduce 
historical emission as the de facto BAU baseline may be close to zero emissions. However, 
suppressed demand methodologies consider normative aspects in establishing baselines 
at least for so-called minimum service levels for the provision of basic services (CDM EB 
2012). This issue was a central aspect of reform efforts to make the CDM accessible to 
underrepresented countries. While the issue was controversially discussed, it is now well-
established in several CDM methodologies that are widely used in Africa (e.g. AMS-I.L for 
rural electrification). Crucially, the suppressed demand concept was based on a baseline 
approach in the CDM rules. Therefore, it is a key question for Africa of whether suppressed 
demand should be explicitly mentioned in the Art.6.4 rules or whether it could be understood 
as a benchmark approach that takes into account the specific circumstances of LDCs. 
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2.4. Overview on Article 6 and key links to NDC, 
 Transparency and Climate Finance
Key messages of section 2.4
 • Article 6 negotiation issues are closely linked to other Articles of the PA, in particular the 
Enhanced Transparency Framework (Article 13), NDCs (Article 4), the Global Stocktake (Article 
14) and climate finance (Article 9).
 • For DNAs this means that Article 6 oversight must be aligned with other departments in charge 
of the respective processes and decisions, requiring institutional coordination and capacities.
Key negotiation issues on Article 6 are closely linked to other Articles of the PA, in particular 
monitoring and reporting of progress towards achieving NDCs goals. This concerns Article 
4.13 (Guidance on accounting for the mitigation components of NDCs) and Article 13.7 
(Information to be disclosed in the transparency framework). A potential mobilization of 
results-based finance would create linkages with provisions on climate finance (Article 9, 
PA). In addition, activities under Article 6 will be taken into account in the Global Stocktake 
(Article 14, PA). Figure 6 shows these links and the respective decisions. For Eastern African 
DNAs, this means that Article 6 oversight cannot happen in isolation, but must align with 
other departments that are in charge of the respective PA processes or issues. Therefore, 
a higher degree of internal coordination and respective capacities is likely to be required. 
However, engagement of powerful institutions and careful coordination may also facilitate 
significant upscaling potential beyond individual projects.
Figure 12: Article 6 and the PA architecture
Source: based on Michaelowa et al
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Article 6 relevance 
and opportunities for Eastern 
Africa countries
 Key messages of section 3.1
 • The East African CDM pipeline has been growing in recent years and has been dominated by 
activities with high sustainable development contributions. However, the benefits have been 
limited as CER prices had already crashed, when the mechanism became more accessible to 
Africa and LDCs through comprehensive reforms, proactive negotiations of African negotiators 
and domestic capacity building.
 • Therefore, African negotiators and decision makers may consider to engage both within and 
beyond UNFCCC negotiations for defining an organized CDM transition that prioritizes those 
existing CDM activities meet all PA requirements and are fully aligned with NDC targets and 
accounting.
 • CDM transition of PoAs is particularly relevant for EAA member states, as their broad umbrella 
structure enable a rapid upscaling of existing mitigation activities.
 • Since the CDM did not work well in many sectors (e.g. forestry, agriculture, transport) new 
opportunities e.g. in nature-based solutions or new technologies (e.g. clean mobility, hydrogen).
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3.1. Potential for CDM transition 
Securing an organized transition for existing CDM activities that meet PA requirements
When the CDM became more accessible to Africa and LDCs through comprehensive 
reforms, proactive AGN negotiations and domestic building of host countries,7 CER prices 
had already crashed on the secondary market due to a lack of global mitigation ambition and 
CER import restrictions in some industrialized countries . Trust in the CDM was never fully 
restored and international demand for CERs has remained low to date, despite some notable 
high-quality project exceptions which sell their CERs on the primary market (i.e. directly to 
a buyer through an emission reduction purchase agreement). Africa’s CDM pipeline started 
to build only comparatively late. Still, as a result of the emissions profile and sustainable 
development priorities of the host countries, the African CDM pipeline has been growing 
over the years and has been increasingly dominated by activities with high sustainable 
development contributions (e.g. improved cook stoves, rural electrification). As access to 
the CDM remains limited in scope and scale, it is crucial to be able build on the hard-won 
progress achieved through longstanding efforts (Hoch et al 2020). Therefore, Eastern 
African Article 6 negotiators and decision-makers need to have a good understanding of 
their domestic CDM and voluntary carbon market portfolio in order to advocate in UNFCCC 
negotiations for prioritizing those existing CDM activities that are anticipated to be part of 
conditional NDC elements. At least from a methodology perspective, supporting a relatively 
small number of CDM methodologies for transition to Article 6 enables the vast majority of 
Africa’s CDM pipeline to transition.
However, African countries also need to be careful about a selective process that filters 
which activities and units will be eligible in transitioning from the CDM to Article 6 as the 
mitigation potentials in other CDM host regions is much higher. Therefore, if not well-
designed, transitioning activities could ‘crowd out’ African CDM activities with a higher 
degree of environmental integrity and sustainable development contributions, as resulting 
may only be available at higher prices. However, the controversy about CDM transition pits 
the largest buying and selling countries against each other. While the African CDM portfolio 
is generally seen positively, it may become ‘collateral damage’ of these conflicting interests. 
This makes it particularly important for African Parties to argue forcefully for a lifeline for the 
regional CDM portfolio that meets all PA requirements. 
PoAs as key vehicles for potential rapid upscaling of carbon market activities 
CDM transition is particularly relevant for CDM PoAs as their existing umbrella structure 
would enable a rapid upscaling of mitigation activities once regulatory certainty about 
transition to Article 6 would have been secured. Moving from projects to programmes was 
a major conceptual CDM innovation since it allows for aggregating decentralized CDM 
activities with many different component activities, sometimes even hosted by several 
countries. PoAs are often seen as a key reform to open access to the CDM in Africa: 
7  Lacking demand from the EU, which had previously been the dominant CER destination, dried up the 
market for CERs. Still, is crucial to acknowledge that other Annex I countries did not buy CERs at all (e.g. USA) 
or withdrew from Kyoto after the first CP (e.g. Canada, Japan). 
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The African CDM PoA portfolio consists largely of small-scale activities supporting 
renewable energy, energy efficiency and landfill gas destruction (Hoch et al 2019). As 
described in section 2.3.3, SBSTA has been tasked to develop criteria for a fast track 
procedure for the transition of CDM PoAs, which was a demand of the African Group in 
the negotiations. It is however still unclear how this process may look like, although it is 
clear that further thoughts are required, e.g. with regard to how CDM transition cut-offs 
apply to programmatic activities (are programme or activity levels the main reference point 
for the cut-off, e.g. would the registration date of the entire PoA count, or the dates of the 
inclusion of the component project activities?). About 14% of the African PoA portfolio were 
registered after 2015 (i.e. after the adoption of the PA), which could potentially act as a 
cut-off date for the transition via a fast track procedure. PoAs can be easily upscaled by 
adding further component project activities (CPAs), provided there is regulatory certainty 
and market demand.
An issue where CDM transition may be less relevant since more fundamental regulatory 
reforms may be required to tap into relevant sectors are nature-based solutions (NBS). This 
includes the CDM rules for forestry and agriculture, as well as potentially blue carbon, which 
were flawed due to unsuccessful attempts to develop methodologies that address the 
permanence problem mentioned above. However, the large share of GHG emissions in the 
forestry and agriculture in several EAA NDCs suggest that these should actually be priority 
sectors. Besides active REDD+ participation by several countries, there have been multiple 
CDM projects supporting afforestation/reforestation in member countries. Crucially, several 
of these (here: in Ethiopia and Kenya) have since deregistered from the CDM mechanism 
due to the low attractiveness in particular of temporary CERs (tCER). Therefore, East African 
negotiators may want to pay attention to that solutions for sector-specific methodological 
challenges are being identified – in particular the issue of permanence – in order to be able 
to tap into the mitigation potentials of these sectors under Article 6. Given that East African 
progress in accessing the CDM is still largely confined to sustainable energy access, 
it is also important to assess how the mitigation potential in other sectors (e.g. forestry, 
agriculture, transport etc.) can be mobilized and which CDM elements should reasonably 
be transitioned. 
Standardized Baselines as a potential building block for establishment of sector-specific 
baselines under Article 6
Standardized baselines are established for a Party or group of Parties to facilitate the 
calculation of Emission Reductions and removals and/or the determination of additionality 
for CDM project activities, while ensuring environmental integrity. Although setting the 
baseline for the calculation of greenhouse gas emission reductions has been an expensive 
and time-consuming exercise in some cases, the development of standardized baselines 
for a region/country or group of countries brings significant benefits such as, reduced time 
and cost incurred by the project developers, provides credibility of the data that was used 
for calculation, generates a habit of QA/QC compliance at the data generation level etc. The 
The large share of GHG 
emissions in forestry and 
agriculture in several 
EAA NDCs suggest that 
these should actually be 
priority sectors.
Article 6 Negotiations Handbook for Eastern Africa 41
use of such baselines can also enhance transparency, objectivity and predictability, and 
scale up the abatement of GHG emissions in developing countries and LDCs. 
The standardized baseline infrastructure could enable countries to establish baseline 
scenarios in a cost-effective way, for functional reporting of mitigation achievements under 
Article 6. The transition of the standardized baseline approach to the Article 6 framework 
would require establishment of baselines in several other priority sectors for the region 
other than those existing in the power, waste and biomass sectors. Ensuring that SBs can 
be developed under Article 6 helps to build on the existing capacity developed in East 
Africa under the CDM.
3.2. Article 6 piloting
Key messages of section 3.2
 • Despite the lack of success in finalizing the Article 6 rulebook, several governments and development 
banks have jointly initiated pilot activities in East African and other host countries. Several actors 
engage in creating enabling conditions such as promoting research and development.
 • The Joint Crediting Mechanism (JCM) and the Standardized Crediting Framework (SCF) are 
particularly relevant in the East African context, because pilots are already being undertaken in 
Ethiopia and Kenya.
 • Other relevant pilots are the Swiss KliK foundation programme, as it is one of the most advanced 
bilateral initiatives with the objective and resources to procure substantial amounts of credits.
 • The Adaptation Benefit Mechanism, initiated and piloted by the AfDB in several African countries 
stands out as key example of a non-market activity that could be a potential candidate for Article 6
Initial experience and further opportunities of Article 6 piloting in Africa 
Despite the lack of success in finalizing the Article 6 rulebook as discussed above, several 
governments and development banks have jointly initiated pilot activities in East African and 
other host countries (Greiner et al. 2019). Most of the concrete pilot activities which aim at 
generating ITMOs operate under the bilateral cooperative approaches under Article 6.2 or 
remain instrument neutral, as the multilateral mechanism under Article 6.4 has yet to be 
operationalized. Furthermore, several actors engage in creating enabling conditions such as 
promoting research and development, e.g. on methodologies, promoting the establishment 
of necessary regulatory processes and carbon market infrastructure or building capacities 
of relevant institutions (e.g. the DNA) and stakeholders. Eight African countries, three of 
which are East African countries, are currently involved in pilot projects (see Figure 13), 
which offers an opportunity to jointly reflect on these early Art.6 experiences, both in order 
to facilitate setting domestic processes for Article 6 engagement, but also to provide inputs 
into the ongoing climate negotiations taking into account regional circumstances.  
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Figure 13: African Article 6 pilot activities
Source: own compilation, based on Greiner et al. (2019)
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The Joint Crediting Mechanism (JCM) and the Standardized Crediting Framework (SCF) are particularly 
relevant in the East African context, because pilots are already being undertaken in Ethiopia and Kenya. The 
JCM was established by Japan to promote bilateral cooperation with development countries and facilitate the 
implementation of mitigation actions in developing countries, in particular contributing to the NDC of Japan and 
the host country. Japan has signed agreements with 17 countries, and has more than 40 projects registered, of 
which 19 achieved issuances. Japan anticipates to continue operating the JCM under Article 6.2. The JCM is 
relevant has it allows to build experience with comprehensive oversight functions by host governments as well 
as with crucial NDC features such as reinterpreting additionality in light of NDCs, avoiding double counting or 
OMGE.
The SCF for sustainable energy access provides a simplified crediting approach that builds on the CDM but 
adjusts it to host country circumstances. Implemented by the World Bank’s Carbon Initiative for Development 
(Ci-Dev). SCF pilots have been launched in Senegal and Rwanda (Greiner et al. 2019). In Rwanda, the SCF 
builds on the Inyenyeri improved cookstove programme, with key stakeholders including the Rwanda 
Environment Management Authority (REMA), the Ministry of Environment, and Inyenyeri (a private sector project 
developer). While the Ci-Dev PoAs continue to operate under the CDM in both host countries, the SCF operates 
as a simulation in parallel to real world CDM operations which enables a direct comparison between the two 
approaches, including their costs and timelines, institutional set-up, and stakeholder engagement. Once the 
piloting phase comes to an end, Senegal, Rwanda and CI-Dev will evaluate the lessons learned and may decide 
to shift the basis of their contractual arrangements from the CDM to the SCF. The SCF may in this case enable 
the transaction of ITMOs (Greiner et al. 2019). The SCF is also valuable as it presents an opportunity to establish 
domestic rules, procedures and responsibilities for operating the SCF activity which is likely to resemble Art.6 
responsibilities closely.
The Swiss KliK foundation programme is another relevant pilot, as it is one of the most advanced bilateral 
initiatives with the objective and resources to procure a substantial amount of credits. For 2021-2030, the KliK 
Foundation aims to purchase up to 35 million tons of CO2e to compensate emissions of Suisse fossil motor 
fuel importers under the Swiss CO2 law. At the time of writing, the Foundation has registered 93 private and 
governmental partner organizations that are eligible to submit project propositions in calls for proposals. Pre-
selected activities will be developed into full project proposals, with financial support from the KliK Foundation. 
Before ITMOs can be purchased by KliK, a bilateral framework agreement will be signed between the Swiss 
Government and the respective host country. Project developers will then engage in separate discussion with 
KLIK as the buyer. Therefore, an additional level of complexity compared to the CDM emerges.  
The Adaptation Benefit Mechanism (ABM) as a potential Article 6.8 activity
Even though the purpose of Article 6.8 and the potential shape of NMAs are still under discussion, there are far 
fewer declared pilot activities than for market-based cooperation. The ABM, initiated and piloted by the AfDB in 
several African countries stands out as key non-carbon market activity that could be a potential candidate for 
non-market-based approaches under Article 6.
The ABM is the first attempt to operationalize a mechanism that supports adaptation activities. Established 
in 2016, in collaboration with the governments of Uganda and Côte d’Ivoire and in consultation with various 
stakeholders, the ABM aims to quantify, verify and certify the sustainable development benefits of adaptation 
actions using results-based finance (Greiner et al. 2019). In October 2019, the AfDB established an interim 
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executive committee of the ABM, developed draft modalities and procedures for the mechanism and initiated 
a pilot phase until 2023 in which 10-12 demonstration projects will be tested in Africa. In the pilot phase, the 
effectiveness of the mechanism for mobilizing private finance for adaptation will be tested. It also serves to 
establish sufficient infrastructure for the operation of the mechanism, advancing methodological work and raising 
awareness for the mechanism. It is envisaged that after the pilot phase project developers and host countries 
will be enabled to determine Adaptation Benefits in advance and sign off-take agreements with climate change 
financiers which guarantee payments on delivery of Adaptation Benefits.
The first ABM demonstration project will be set up in Côte d’Ivoire in collaboration with The World Agroforestry 
Centre. It aims at introducing sustainable agroforestry measures to make smallholder cocoa farmers’ communities 
resilient to climate change, while contributing to enhancing quality of life for women and youth. The goal is to 
replicate this approach to other regions in Cote d’Ivoire and to at least three other cocoa producing countries in 
the region. 
Overall, all three Article 6 avenues are relevant for East Africa. The region is well engaged in Article 6.2 pilot 
activities and therefore able to learn first-hand which institutional approaches to Article 6 are promising. The 
short-term priority is likely to focus on CDM transition, given the existing stake in host country pipelines and the 
imminent potential cut-off dates. Particularly the approach to treating programmatic approaches is important, 
where inclusion dates of component project activities should count instead of the registration date of the entire 
programme.
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Strategic considerations 
and practical steps for engaging
in negotiations 
 Key messages of section4
 • Finalizing the rules for Article 6 so that they reflect East African and AGN priorities and 
circumstances requires both strategic planning as well as effectively employing tactical negotiation 
skills, including a deep and nuanced understanding of negotiations terminology, conventions and 
processes.
 • Given the considerable controversies on several crunch issues in Article 6 negotiations, it is crucial 
to define substantive priorities and translating them into negotiations text options. Moreover, it 
is important to engage in different virtual formats with strategically relevant Parties which are 
needed to forge compromise proposals that reflect East African priorities, even though formal 
decisions may only be possible once physical meetings can resume.
 • The EAA can serve as the primary regional platform to support member countries in improving 
their understanding and exchanging their views on Article 6 negotiations and contribute to AGN 
positions. East African negotiators may also consider the potential of harnessing their roles in 
overlapping negotiation constituencies, in particular the LDC group, but also the Coalition of 
Rainforest Nations and others. 
As became evident in the preceding chapters, Article 6 of the PA has redefined cornerstones of the future global 
carbon market. However, more detailed technical rules still need to be agreed, which currently prevents at least 
multilateral Article 6 mechanisms from becoming operational even though bilateral cooperation has already 
commenced. Finalizing these rules so that they reflect East African and AGN priorities and circumstances 
requires   both   strategic   considerations   as   well   as skillful engagement by East African Article 6 negotiators, 
including a deep and nuanced understanding of negotiations language and processes.
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Engagement in the negotiations
Negotiation text proposals often use highly coded language and jargon (compare 
the glossary in Annex II), in which specific terms contain a lot of meaning that may not 
immediately be obvious if someone has not been immersed in the UNFCCC process for a 
long time (Abeysinghe et al. 2015). 8 In addition, a myriad of technical terms and acronyms 
is being used in the negotiations. Familiarity with negotiations terminology is key to engage 
effectively in the negotiations. Typical negotiation texts contain basic drafting language 
and qualifiers as well as brackets. Brackets indicate disagreement over the text contained 
therein. Sometimes different options for e.g. a target year are presented in parallel→ [2025]
[2030]. A high number of square brackets points to significant disagreements over the text, 
whereas a reduction of brackets from one text iteration to the next indicates progress on 
forging consensus. 
Abeysinghe et al. (2015) provide an overview of negotiations language with explanations of 
the meaning of typical negotiations terms. For example, the differentiation between “shall”, 
“should” and “may” is crucial for establishing the legal quality of the issue at hand. 
"shall" "should" "may"
Action is required (obligatory or 
binding)
No obligation, but advised (often 
used for principles)
No obligation, offers a possibility 
or alternative course of action
"37.Each mechanism methodology 
shall require the selection of a 
transparent and conservative 
approach, assumptions, ,,,."
"37. Each mechanism 
methodology [...] should 
encourage an increase in 
ambition over time".
"42. Standardized and/or regional 
and/or subregional performance 
based-baselines may be 
developed by the Supervisory 
Body at the request of the host 
Party or …." 
If negotiations text uses the term ‘shall’, action is legally binding and therefore 
required. However, this can still be softened by inserting qualifiers such as ‘shall 
strive to’, which only requires Parties to try to do something and are therefore less 
strong. If the term “should” be used, the issue is not obligatory, but only advisable 
or expected. This is often used for introducing high level principles. Provisions 
which are preceded by the word ‘may’ present one possibility or alternative course 
of action, but are neither binding nor advised.
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In addition, negotiations text often contains so-called qualifying language. The following 
excerpt from the December 14, 2019, Article 6 Presidency text contains both the term 
“should” discussed above and the qualifier ‘as appropriate’: “37. Each mechanism 
methodology [...] should take into account, as appropriate: uncertainty; any leakage 
due to the implementation of the Article 6, paragraph 4, activity; relevant policy; 
consistency with the NDC of the host Party, any contribution to reducing emission levels 
in the host Party, any long-term low GHG emission development strategy of the host 
Party and the long-term goal of the Paris Agreement [...].”  This qualifier gives Parties 
flexibility in determining how the application of the principle is appropriate (Abeysinghe et 
al. 2015). 
In addition, sometimes text includes terms which ‘hide’ meaning or replace a word which 
has become controversial in the negotiations and is therefore ‘burnt’. For example, the 
Presidency text on Article 6 of December 14, 2019 contains a reference to ‘projected 
emissions’ as a potential baseline approach. Such a baseline approach may include business 
as usual (BAU) baselines. However, the concept and term of BAU itself is contested in the 
negotiations, therefore it is not used explicitly in the text.
In addition to terminology, it is crucial to understand the role of different negotiation formats, 
which issues are being negotiated in them and with whom to coordinate. Gupta (2000) and 
Tenzing (2016) provide detailed overviews of these different UNFCCC negotiation formats. 
The complexity of climate negotiations requires a good organisation within the delegation of 
the respective country and regional or thematic constituencies. Even within a topic such as 
Article 6, several different sub-aspects of the negotiation sessions may happen in parallel, 
therefore delegates should clearly define who covers which negotiation track (e.g., CDM 
transition under CMP, Art.6 baselines under SBSTA), know the position of their delegation 
and negotiation group on specific sub-issues (e.g., corresponding adjustments) and 
exchange regularly regarding the status of negotiations. For the negotiation tracks for each 
political (COP, CMA and CMP) and technical (SBI/SBSTA) body, there are different meeting 
formats with different levels of formality (contact groups, informals, informal informals, etc.) 
which allow to negotiate or discuss according to different rules and conventions. 
Negotiation tactics
It is important to develop and adjust positions on specific thematic issues within negotiation 
groups. Traditional negotiation groups are divided between developing countries (G77+ 
China; African Group; AOSIS; LDCs) and developed countries (EU, EIG, umbrella group). In 
recent years, negotiation groups have become more dynamic, with new groups emerging. 
Membership between groups sometimes overlaps (e.g., all African LDCs are members of 
both the African Group and the LDC group) and this can be leveraged within the negotiations. 
Coordinating synergies and common interests between these negotiation groups can 
lead to strong coalitions. In addition, different negotiation strands are often interlinked. As 
described above, the Article 6 negotiations are linked with negotiations on transparency, 
NDCs and climate finance. Skilled negotiators may use this linkage to include negotiation 
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text which pertains to a certain topic under a separately negotiated topic. A key example 
is paragraph 77(d) of the ETF, which was adopted with decision 18/CMA.1 at COP24. It 
includes a ‘shall’-provision on reporting under Article 6 and corresponding adjustments in 
the Art.13 negotiations on transparency which did not correspond to the status of Article 6 
negotiations. 
Furthermore, procedural issues can be used for negotiation tactics. For example, a Party 
may add a request to include or remove a point from the agenda as an additional 
‘negotiation chip’ or try to prevent negotiation outcomes by delaying negotiations. 
Increasingly, COPs tend to run overtime, with COP25 breaking the record by running 44 
hours overtime. 
Strategic Considerations
Regarding strategic considerations, Article 6 negotiations are characterized by an 
extremely high uncertainty about both substantive and procedural matters since multilateral 
agreement by consensus needs to be achieved under the conditions of a historic global 
pandemic that prevents large in-person meetings. Therefore, it is crucial to find alternative 
ways to elaborate a clear approach to defining substantive priorities and to develop a 
strategic approach to engaging relevant partners which are needed to explore compromise 
proposals that reflect East African priorities, even though formal decisions may only be 
possible once physical meetings can resume. 
 
On a strategic level, the Eastern African Alliance (EAA) can serve as the primary regional 
platform that can support member countries in improving their understanding and 
exchanging their views on the priority issues for Article 6 summarized above, as well as to 
support institutional readiness for implementing Article 6 domestically. The EAA can work 
towards becoming a bridge between AGN and member countries by facilitating knowledge 
sharing and coordinating input into relevant AGN-internal discussions and preparations on 
Article 6. This is important in order to ensure that the specific experiences made in East 
Africa will feed into AGN positions, for instance concerning open issues in the forest sector 
or suppressed demand mentioned above. While such EAA capacity development support 
can substantially improve preparations for COP, including preparing own ideas and inputs 
to position papers and draft text proposals, it is important to establish an institutionalized 
working modality that operates on a continual basis and also captures relevant events and 
fora outside formal UNFCCC negotiations, in which key negotiators discuss technical or 
political issues relating to Article 6.
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Related, a crucial strategic issue to consider is that of overlapping negotiation 
constituencies. While AGN may be the primary regional negotiation bloc, the LDC Group 
is also a crucial negotiation alliance which has at times been very influential. Since all EAA 
member countries except Kenya are formally LDCs, they also have a role in this group. Other 
relevant alliances may include the Coalition of Rainforest Nations or other. There is potential 
in working towards aligning priorities among such different constituencies and there are 
historical precedents for powerful cooperation e.g. between AGN and LDCs during COP17 
in Durban, which reset the UNFCCC negotiations after the failed Copenhagen Conference 
by creating the Durban Platform negotiations track that ultimately resulted in the PA. 
However, there are also instances of conflicting priorities of different constituencies which 
need to be taken into account, e.g. the influence of Arab countries on Northern African 
countries which complicates finding consensus within AGN.
While engagement by EAA member countries would strengthen AGN, it is also likely to lead 
to a better understanding of evolving Article 6 requirements for domestic implementation 
of Article 6. Since a lot of new requirements will apply to implementing Article 6 activities, 
member countries can use EAA as a platform for exchanges on practical questions related 
to technical issues. Carbon markets have historically always evolved in a learning-by-doing 
approach, and there is likely going to be a lot of iteration between national processes and 
international rule-making, since Article 6 rules still remain at a very high political level, and 
are likely to continually evolve over time, just as UNFCCC rules for the Kyoto mechanisms 
have in the past.
A more effective engagement by EAA member countries in practical steps towards finalizing 
Article 6 rules during upcoming SBs/COP26 and other fora will also benefit from improving 
the general UNFCCC negotiation skills of EAA negotiators. This includes understanding 
which issues are being negotiated on which of the different negotiation tracks (CMA-CMP- 
SBSTA-SBI), where to find information within the UNFCCC systems, differences between 
document and meeting types as well as practical tips on how to access information and the 
relevance of outreach (e.g. participating in side events in order to communicate national/ 
regional experiences and priorities). As it is impossible to capture all the details of this 
highly complex material in this guidebook, Annex 1 offers an overview of further resources 
that allow interested readers to study either specific issues related to Article 6 or general 
overview into the UNFCCC negotiations in more detail. Moreover, Annex 2 presents a 
glossary of key terms relevant for the Article 6 negotiations.
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Annex I: Key resources 
Moving towards next generation carbon markets – Observations from Article 6 pilots, 
2019, Climate Finance Innovators 
IFDD Negotiation guide COP25, 2019, IFDD 
IFDD Negotiation guide COP25, 2019, IFDD 
Closing the deal on CDM transition, 2019, Climate Finance Innovators
Pocket guide to capacity building, 2020, European Capacity Building Initiative
2019 Climate Change Conference 2019, Highlights for Saturday 14 and Sunday 15 
December 2019, Earth Negotiations Bulletin (ENB)-  The ENB’s latest daily COP 25 coverage 
is available here in English, French, Spanish, and Japanese languagest.
European capacity building initiative: Policy briefs and notes- All published briefs and notes 
can be accessed here.
How to become a delegate - A highly hands on description of the day to day practice of a 
UNFCCC negotiations session.
UNFCCC documents and decisions - All published UNFCCC documents and decisions can 
be found here
UNFCCC Regional Collaboration Centre (RCC), Kampala  - RCC Kampala newsletter can 
be accessed here.
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Annex II: Glossary of terms
Kyoto Protocol was adopted on 11 December 1997. Owing to a complex ratification process, 
it entered into force on 16 February 2005. Currently, there are 192 Parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol. Kyoto Protocol operationalizes the UNFCCC by committing industrialized countries 
and economies in transition to limit and reduce greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions in 
accordance with agreed individual targets. The Convention itself only asks those countries 
to adopt policies and measures on mitigation and to report periodically.
Clean Development Mechanism is a mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol, the purpose of 
which, in accordance with Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, is to assist non-Annex I Parties 
in achieving sustainable development and in contributing to the ultimate objective of the 
Convention, and to assist Annex I Parties in achieving compliance with their quantified 
emission limitation and reduction commitments under Article 3 of the Kyoto Protocol. 
Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) are Kyoto Protocol units equal to 1 metric tonne of 
CO2 equivalent. CERs are issued for emission reductions from CDM project activities. Two 
special types of CERs called temporary certified emission reduction (tCERs) and long-term 
certified emission reductions (lCERs) are issued for emission removals from afforestation 
and reforestation CDM projects.
The Paris Agreement it is a legally binding global climate agreement adopted by 195 
countries in December 2015 and entered into force in November 2016. It aims to strengthen 
the global response to the threat of climate change by keeping a global temperature rise 
this century well below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts 
to limit the temperature increase even further to 1.5 degrees Celsius.
Cooperative Approaches- The Paris Agreement offers Parties the opportunity to cooperate 
with one another when implementing their nationally determined contributions (NDCs). The 
cooperation mechanisms designed to assist this process should not only make it easier 
to achieve existing reduction targets, but also to raise ambition in future efforts and to 
promote sustainable development. The cooperation mechanisms enshrined in Article 6 of 
the Paris Agreement form the legal framework to allow use of market-based climate change 
mitigation mechanisms. 
The Conference of the Parties (COP) is the supreme decision-making body of the 
Convention. All States that are Parties to the Convention are represented at the COP, at 
which they review the implementation of the Convention and any other legal instruments 
that the COP adopts and take decisions necessary to promote the effective implementation 
of the Convention, including institutional and administrative arrangements.
Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement 
(CMA) is the supreme body of the Convention, shall serve as the meeting of the Parties 
Article 6 Negotiations Handbook for Eastern Africa 55
to the Paris Agreement. All States that are Parties to the Paris Agreement are represented 
at the CMA, while States that are not Parties participate as observers. The CMA oversees 
the implementation of the Paris Agreement and takes decisions to promote its effective 
implementation.
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) is one of two permanent 
subsidiary bodies to the Convention established by the Conference of the Parties (COP)/ 
Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol 
(CMP). It supports the work of the COP, the CMP and the CMA through the provision of 
timely information and advice on scientific and technological matters as they relate to the 
Convention, its Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement.
Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) is a term used under the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) whereby a country that has joined 
the Paris Agreement outlines its plans for reducing its emissions. Some countries’ NDCs 
also address how they will adapt to climate change impacts, and what support they need 
from, or will provide to, other countries to adopt low-carbon pathways and to build climate 
resilience. 
Article 6.2 provides an accounting framework for international cooperation, such as linking 
the emissions-trading schemes of two or more countries (for example, linking the European 
Union cap-and-trade program with emissions-reduction transfers from Switzerland). It also 
allows for the international transfer of carbon credits between countries (WRI).
Article 6.4 establishes a central UN mechanism to trade credits from emissions reductions 
generated through specific projects. For example, country A could pay for country B to 
build a wind farm instead of a coal plant. Emissions are reduced, country B benefits from the 
clean energy and country A gets credit for the reductions.
Article 6.8 establishes a work program for non-market approaches, such as applying taxes 
to discourage emissions. For this explainer, we will focus on the carbon markets elements 
of Article 6.
Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcome (ITMOs) are emission reduction units 
that Parties cooperating under Article 6.2 of the Paris Agreement can transfer and use 
for attaining their NDC. The Paris Agreement requires that Parties that are engaged in 
ITMO transfers shall ensure environmental integrity, apply robust accounting and promote 
sustainable development. The use of ITMOs to achieve NDCs shall be voluntary and 
authorized by participating Parties (Article 6.3).
Additionality stipulates that in the context of crediting mechanisms any mitigation activity 
needs to demonstrate that the activity (and thus the resulting mitigation) would not have 
happened in the absence of the revenue from the sale of emissions units created by the 
market-based mechanism. It is important to prevent the generation of fictitious carbon 
Article 6 Negotiations Handbook for Eastern Africa56
credits and thus for ensuring environmental integrity and ensuring the efficient allocation 
of funds.
Corresponding Adjustment means that when one country sells emissions reductions 
to another, it must adjust its own emissions figures accordingly. In other words, it must 
increase its level of emissions reductions in its NDC to make up for the fact that it sold some 
emissions reductions to another country. 
Double Counting refers Parties credits under Article 6.2 are subject to robust accounting 
to ensure avoidance of double counting, meaning each ITMO must only count towards the 
targets in one country’s NDC.  For example, country A might build a wind farm and then sell 
the credits for those emissions reductions to country B, so now country B can count those 
emissions reductions as part of its progress to achieving its NDC. But if country A claims 
those same emissions reductions toward achieving its own NDC, that is double-counting.
Article 6 Technical Expert Review (A6TER) reviews Parties’ reports involved in cooperative 
approaches covering- participation requirements, application of corresponding adjustments 
and a description of the cooperative approach, annual quantitative information on ITMOs 
authorized, transferred, acquired, hold, cancelled and used. In addition, A6TER  reviews 
Parties’ reports inter alia on  how corresponding adjustments have been applied to ensure 
the avoidance of double use or counting of the ITMOs acquired and used and ITMOs 
authorized for other uses, and how the cooperative approaches promote environmental 
integrity; it reviews Parties’ annual information on adjustments to the annual emissions level 
(or levels of another relevant NDC indicator), and, in case reporting includes the end year 
of an NDC period, an assessment of whether NDC targets were achieved pursuant to the 
application of corresponding adjustments.
Enhanced Transparency Framework- Parties that engage in cooperative approaches 
must have arrangements in place to authorize and track ITMOs, in accordance with the 
requirements of the guidance; and provide the most recent national inventory report 
required under the enhanced transparency framework. Host parties that wish to register a 
mitigation activity under the Article 6.4 mechanism must  also establish a national authority 
for the mechanism; communicate how its participation in the mechanism contributes 
to sustainable development and ensures on a continuous basis that this participation 
contributes to the implementation of the NDC and its long-term strategy, if applicable; and 
indicate to the Supervisory Body the types of activities it would consider approving and 
how they would contribute to mitigation in the host Party and achievement of its NDC.
Article 6.4 Emission Reduction- A crediting mechanism under the PA, for issuing carbon 
credits against real, measurable and additional emission reductions from mitigation 
activities approved by the host Parties (Article 6.4). The Parties to the PA will elaborate the 
rules, modalities, and procedures for this mechanism. The mechanism will be governed by 
a “Supervisory Body” that oversees the registration of activities and the issuance of credits. 
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These Article 6.4 emission reduction credits, called “A6.4ERs” can be internationally 
transferred if the host Party authorizes the transfer, but they can also be used in the domestic 
host Party context. Should they be internationally transferred, they become ITMOs and the 
Article 6.2 applies.
Biennial Transparency Report (BTR)- All Parties will submit a BTR. The scope of the BTR will 
cover information necessary to track progress made in implementing and achieving NDCs 
under Article 4, information related to climate change impacts and adaptation under Article 
7, information on financial, technology development and transfer and capacity-building 
support needed and received under Articles 9–11, information on financial, technology 
development and transfer and capacity-building support provided and mobilized under 
Articles 9–11.
Share of Proceeds is a leavy under the Paris Agreement to support for adaptation and 
administrative purposes, which provides support to vulnerable countries to adapt to the 
impacts of climate change under Article 6.4 (trading credits from emissions reductions 
resulting from specific projects), but did not mention it in Article 6.2 (when two or more 
countries transfer emissions reductions, for example through linked emissions-trading 
schemes). 
Overall Mitigation of Global Emissions (OMGE) Article 6.4 stipulates that the mechanism 
is to deliver an OMGE. For some Parties, overall mitigation in global emissions could mean 
that some of the credits generated under Article 6.4 for emissions reductions are essentially 
taken off the table, not used toward any Party’s NDC. In other words, rather than transferring 
them between Parties and allowing a buying country to count those emissions reductions 
toward its target, these unused emissions reductions could be set aside to provide a net 
decrease in global emissions. Countries are primarily divided on whether overall mitigation 
in global emissions applies only to Article 6.4 or to Article 6.2 approaches as well, as well as 
how overall mitigation in global emissions is done in practice (via discounts, cancellations, 
or other means).
Voluntary Carbon Market is a market for the voluntary compensation of greenhouse gas 
emissions. It enables companies and individuals to voluntarily offset their carbon footprint.
CORSIA is a global market-based mechanism scheme in the form of the carbon offsetting 
and reduction scheme for international aviation to address any annual increase in total 
CO2 emissions from international civil aviation (i.e. civil aviation flights that depart in one 
country and arrive in a different country) above the 2020 levels, taking into account special 
circumstances and respective capabilities. CORSIA is implemented in phases, starting with 
participation of States on a voluntary basis, Pilot phase (from 2021 through 2023) and first 
phase (from 2024 through 2026), followed by participation of all States except the States 
exempted from offsetting requirements.
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United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is the United 
Nations entity tasked with supporting the global response to the threat of climate change. 
The Convention has near universal membership (197 Parties) and is the parent treaty of the 
2015 Paris Agreement.
Environmental Integrity in context of Article 6 means that using international transfers 
does not result in higher global GHG emissions than if mitigation targets of NDCs had been 
achieved only through domestic mitigation action.
Suppressed demand is the situation where energy services provided are insufficient – 
due to poverty or lack of access to modern energy infrastructure – to meet the needs of 
stakeholders given their human development needs. Suppressed demand in the context 
of CDM refers to because CDM projects estimate emissions reductions and the credits it 
receives through calculating baseline emissions and then subtracting project emissions, 
such approach makes it difficult for LDCs and SIDS Parties to register CDM projects. The 
concept of ‘suppressed demand’ tries to take into account the fact that their per-capita 
emissions would be much higher if the poor had better access to energy and goods. 
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Current Member States:
Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda
Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda 

